This paper considers mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Each player has a continuum state and binary action. By active control, a player can bring its state to a resetting point. All players are coupled through their cost functions. The structural property of the individual strategies is characterized in terms of threshold policies when the mean field game admits a solution. We further introduce a stationary equation system of the mean field game and analyze uniqueness of its solution under positive externalities.
Introduction
Mean field game theory studies stochastic decision problems with a large number of noncooperative players which are individually insignificant but collectively have a significant impact on a particular player. It provides a powerful methodology for reducing complexity in the analysis and design of strategies. With the aid of an infinite population model, one may apply consistent mean field approximations to construct a set of decentralized strategies for the original large but finite population model and show its ε-Nash equilibrium property [18, 19, 22] . A closely related approach is independently developed in [27] . Another related solution notion in Markov decision models is the oblivious equilibrium [41] . For nonlinear diffusion models [10, 22, 27] , the analysis of mean field games depends on tools of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, Fokker-Planck equations, and McKean-Vlasov equations. For further literature in the stochastic analysis setting, see [11, 26] . To address mean field interactions with an agent possessing strong influences, mixed player models are studied in [8, 16, 34, 35] . The readers are referred to [8, 9, 14] for an overview on mean field game theory.
Mean field games have found applications in diverse areas such as power systems [25] , large population electric vehicle recharging control [31, 36] , economics and finance [1, 12, 30] , stochastic growth theory [17] , bio-inspired oscillator games [42] .
This paper studies a class of mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Dynamic games within an MDP setting are a classic area pioneered by Shapley under the name stochastic games [13, 37] . For MDP based mean field game modeling, see [1, 21, 41] . The players in our model have continuum state spaces and binary action spaces, and have coupling through their cost functions. The state of each player is used to model its risk (or distress) level which has random increase if no active control is taken. The one stage cost of a player depends on its own state, the population average state and its control effort. Naturally, the cost of a player is an increasing function of its own state. The motivation of this modeling framework comes from applications including network security investment games, and flue vaccination games [6, 24, 28, 32] ; when the cost function is an increasing function of the population average state, it reflects positive externalities. Markov decision processes with binary action spaces also arise in control of queues and machine replacement problems [3, 7] . Our game model has connection with anonymous sequential games [23] which combine stochastic game modeling with a continuum of players. However, there is a subtle difference regarding treating individual behavior. In anonymous sequential games one determines the equilibrium as a joint state-action distribution of the population and leaves the individual strategies unspecified [23, Sec. 4] , although there is an interpretation of randomized actions for players sharing a given state. Our approach works in the other direction by explicitly specifying the best response of an individual and using its closed-loop state distribution to determine the mean field. Our modeling starts with a finite population, and avoids certain measurability difficulties in directly treating a continuum of random processes [2] .
A very interesting feature of our model is threshold policies for the solution of the mean field game. We consider a finite time horizon game, and identify conditions for the existence of a solution to the fixed point problem. The further analysis deals with the stationary equation of the game and addresses uniqueness under positive externalities, which is done by studying ergodicity of the closed-loop state process of an individual player. Proving uniqueness results in mean field games is a nontrivial task, particularly when attempting to seek less restrictive conditions. This work is perhaps the first to establish uniqueness by the route of exploiting externalities. For this paper, in order to maintain a balance in analyzing the finite horizon problem and the stationary equation system, the existence analysis of the latter is not included and will be reported in another work.
Although mean field games provide a powerful paradigm for substantially reducing complexity in designing strategies, except for the linear-quadratic (LQ) cases [18, 29, 39, 40] allowing simple computations, strategies in general nonlinear systems are often only implicitly determined, rarely taking simple forms. Their numerical solutions lead to high computational load. One of the objectives in this paper is to develop a modeling framework to obtain relatively simple solution structures. This paper is an English version of [20] . All assumptions and results in Sections 2-6 and Appendices A and B of both papers are the same, but Appendices C and D have been rewritten.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The Markov decision process framework is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 solves the best response as a threshold policy. Section 4 shows an ǫ-Nash equilibrium property. The existence of a solution to the mean field equation system is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 introduces the stationary equation system and analyzes uniqueness of its solution. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Markov Decision Process Model

The system dynamics
The system consists of N players denoted by A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N . At time t ∈ Z + = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, the state of A i is denoted by x i t , and its action by a i t . For simplicity, we consider a population of homogeneous players. Each player has a state space S = [0, 1]. A value of S may be interpreted as a risk (or "distress") level. All players have the same action space A = {a 0 , a 1 }. A player can either do nothing (action a 0 ) or make an active effort (action a 1 ). For an interval I, let B(I) denote the Borel σ-algebra of I.
The state of each player evolves as a controlled Markov process which is affected only by its own action. For t ≥ 0 and x ∈ S, the state has transition kernel specified by
where Q 0 (·|x) is a stochastic kernel defined for B ∈ B(S) and Q 0 ([0, x)|x) = 0. The structure of Q 0 indicates that given x i t = x, a i t = a 0 , the state has a transition into [x, 1] . In other words, the state of the player deteriorates if no active control is taken. We call a i t = a 1 and 0 ∈ S a resetting action and a resetting point, respectively.
The vector process (x 1 t , . . . x N t ) constitutes a controlled Markov process in higher dimension with its transition kernel determined as a product measure of the form
where
This product measure implies independent transitions of the N controlled Markov processes.
The individual costs
Define the population average state x
where γ > 0 and γ1 {a i t =a 1 } is the effort cost. The function R ≥ 0 is defined on S × S and models the risk-related cost. For 0 < T < ∞ and discount factor ρ ∈ (0, 1), define the cost
The following assumptions are introduced. Denote the distribution function of ξ by F ξ . To avoid triviality, we assume P (ξ = 1) < 1 in (A3).
We give some motivation about (A3 Remark 1 In fact, (A3) implies the so-called stochastic monotonicity condition (see e.g. [3, 7] ) for Q 0 . We assume the specific form of Q 0 , aiming to obtain more refined properties for the resulting threshold policies and sample path behavior of players.
Example 1 A lab consists of N networked computers M i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , each of which is assigned to a primary user U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and is occasionally accessed by others for its specific resources. A computer has an unfitness state x i t ∈ [0, 1], which randomly degrades due to daily use and potential exposure to malwares, etc. A user U i can take a maintenance action a 1 on M i by installing or updating security software, scanning and cleaning up disk, freeing up memory space, etc., to bring it to an ideal condition be approximated by a deterministic value z t . Definē
We call a i t a pure Markov policy (or strategy) at t if a i t (x) is a mapping from S to A. We say that a i t is a threshold policy with parameter r ∈ [0, 1] if a i t (x) = a 1 for x ≥ r and a i t (x) = a 0 for x < r; this gives a feedback policy. The analysis below will identify properties of the optimal policy.
The dynamic programming equation
Define the value function V (t, x) = inf a i t,TJ i (t, x, z 0,T , a i t,T ), where a i 0,T is from the set of all Markov policies. The dynamic programming equation takes the form
Write (4) in the equivalent form
Denote
Proof. We prove by induction.
which combined with the induction hypothesis implies that
On the other hand, if g 1 (x) and g 2 (x) are continuous
By induction, we conclude that
is strictly increasing on S.
By (7) and (8),
For α 1 < α 2 and β 1 < β 2 , we have min{α 1 , β 1 } < min{α 2 , β 2 }. Taking
is strictly increasing for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
is continuous and strictly increasing in x.
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, (7) and P (ξ = 1) < 1 in (A3).
there exists a unique x * ∈ (0, 1) such that ρG t+1 (x * ) = ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ.
Proof. The lemma follows from Lemma 3 and the intermediate value theorem.
holds, take a i t as a threshold policy with parameter x * given in Lemma 4. Then a i 0,T is an optimal policy.
Proof. It is easy to see that a i T = a 0 is optimal. Consider t ≤ T − 1. By Lemma 3 and 4, we can verify that the minimum in (5) is attained when a i t is chosen according to i)-iii).
Solution of the Mean Field Game
Assume (A1)-(A3). To obtain a solution of the mean field game, we introduce the equation system
By (A1), z 0 = m 0 . We look for a solution (ẑ 0,T ,â i 0T ) for (10) such that {x i t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } is generated by {â i t (x), 0 ≤ t ≤ T } satisfying the rule in Theorem 1 after setting z 0,T =ẑ 0,T . The last equation is the standard consistency condition in mean field games.
Consider the game of N players specified by (1)-(3). Denote a
0,T ). For the performance estimates, we consider the perturbation of a i t in a strategy space U t consisting of all pure Markov strategies depending on (x 1 t , . . . , x N t ).
Definition 1 A set of strategies {a i 0,T , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } for the N players is called an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
where a i 0,T ∈ T t=0 U t and ǫ → 0 as N → ∞.
Then by (11) , lim N →∞ ǫ 1,N = 0. Furthermore,
On the other hand, denoting
The theorem follows by taking ǫ = ǫ 1,N + ǫ 2,N .
Existence Result
We introduce the following assumptions. (H1) ξ has a probability density function denoted by f ξ . (H2) Consider the optimal control problem with cost functionJ
T , there exists c > 0 such that the optimal policy satisfies a i t (x) = a 0 for all x ∈ [0, c] and 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We call (H2) the uniformly positive threshold condition for the family of optimal control problems. When the state of the player is small, the effort cost outweighs the extra benefit in further reducing the risk by active control. This holds uniformly with respect to z 0,T .
Define the class P 0 of probability measures on S as follows. ν ∈ P 0 if there exist a constant c ν ≥ 0 and a measurable function g(x) ≥ 0 defined on [0, 1] such that
where B ∈ B(S) and 1 B is the indicator function of B. When restricted to (0, 1], ν is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure µ Leb .
Assume (A1)-(A3) and (H1)-H2) hold, and the distribution of x i 0 is µ 0 ∈ P 0 for this section. For given z 0,T ∈ Z m 0 T , let the optimally controlled state process be x i t with distribution µ t . Define
Lemma 5 Φ is continuous.
Proof. Let z 0,T ∈ Z m 0 T be fixed, and denote the optimal policy by a i 0,T and the state process by
T , and denote the corresponding optimal policy by b i 0,T and the state process by y i t . Let the distribution of x i t and y i t be µ t and µ ′ t , respectively. Here µ 0 = µ ′ 0 ∈ P 0 . By Lemmas A.1 and A.2, both µ t and µ ′ t are in P 0 for t ≤ T . This ensures that µ t has a small perturbation when the associated positive threshold parameters have a small perturbation. By Lemmas A.3 and A.4, we can first show that lim
Repeating the estimate, we further obtain
Subsequently,
This proves continuity.
Theorem 3 There exists a solution (â i 0,T ,ẑ 0,T ) to (10).
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 5 and Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
6 The Stationary Equations
The stationary form
Assume (A1)-(A3). This section introduces a stationary version of (10). Take z ∈ S. The value function is independent of time t and so denoted as V (x). The dynamic programming equation becomes
which gives
We introduce another equation
for the probability measure π. We say (ẑ,â i ,π) is a stationary solution to (12)- (13) if i) the feedback policyâ i is the best response with respect toẑ in (12) , ii) {x i t , t ≥ 0} under the policyâ i has the stationary distributionπ, and iii) (ẑ,π) satisfies (13) .
The equation system (12)-(13) can be interpreted as follows. For the finite horizon problem, suppose that T is increasing toward ∞. If the family of solutions (indexed by different values of T ) could settle down to a steady-state, we expect for very large t, V (t, x) and z t will be nearly independent of time. This motivates us to introduce (12)- (13) as the stationary version of (10).
Value function with general z
Consider a general z ∈ S not necessarily satisfying (12)-(13) simultaneously, and further determine V (x) by (12) 
Lemma 6 i) Equation (12) has a unique solution V ∈ C ([0, 1], R) .
ii) V is strictly increasing.
iii) The optimal policy can be determined as follows:
, there exists a unique x * ∈ (0, 1) and a i is a threshold policy with parameter x * .
Proof. Part i) will be shown by a fixed point argument. Define the dynamic programming operator
where g ∈ C([0, 1], R). By the method in proving Lemma 1, it can be shown that Lg ∈ C([0, 1], R).
Combining the two cases, we conclude that L is a contraction and has a unique fixed point V .
To show ii), Define g k+1 = Lg k for k ≥ 0, and g 0 = 0. By the method in Lemma 2 and induction, it can be shown that each g k is increasing on [0, 1]. Since lim k→∞ g k − V = 0, V is increasing. Recalling (12), we claim that V is strictly increasing. This proves ii). By showing that G(x) is strictly increasing, we further obtain iii).
For given z, Lemma 6 shows the structure of the optimal policy. Now we specify an optimal policy a i (x) in terms of a threshold parameter θ(z) by the following rule. i) If ρV (0) + γ ≤ ρG(0), then a i (x) ≡ a 1 with θ(z) = 0; ii) if ρG(0) < ρV (0) + γ < ρG(1), a i (x) is a threshold policy with θ(z) ∈ (0, 1); iii) if ρV (0) + γ = ρG(1), then a i (x) has θ(z) = 1; iv) if ρV (0) + γ > ρG(1), a i (x) ≡ a 0 for which we formally denote θ(z) = 1 + .
Remark 2 For the case ρV (0) + γ = ρG(1), the above rule gives a i (1) = a 1 and a i (x) = a 0 for x < 1, which is slightly different from Lemma 6 but still attains optimality.
Stationary distribution for a given threshold policy
Suppose that a i is a threshold policy with parameter θ ∈ (0, 1). Denote the corresponding state process by {x i,θ t , t ≥ 0}, which is a Markov process. Let the probability measure P t (x, ·) on B(S) be the distribution of x i,θ t given x i,θ 0 = x ∈ S. We introduce a further condition on ξ. (A4) ξ has a probability density function f ξ (x) > 0 a.e. on S.
Theorem 4 For θ ∈ (0, 1), {x i,θ t , t ≥ 0} is uniformly ergodic with stationary probability distribution π θ , i.e.,
for some constants K > 0 and r ∈ (0, 1), where · TV is the total variation norm of signed measures.
Proof. See appendix B.
Comparison theorems
Denote z(θ) = 1 0 xπ θ (dx). We have the first comparison theorem on monotonicity.
Proof. See appendix D.
In the further analysis, we consider the case where R takes the product form R(x, z) = R 1 (x)R 2 (z), and where R still satisfies (A2) and R 1 ≥ 0, R 2 > 0. We further assume (A5) R 2 > 0 is strictly increasing on S. This assumption indicates positive externalities since an individual benefits from the decrease of the population average state. This condition has a crucial role in the uniqueness analysis.
Given the product form of R, now (12) takes the form
Consider 0 ≤ z 2 < z 1 ≤ 1 and
Denote the optimal policy as a threshold policy with parameter θ l in [0, 1] or equal to 1 + , where we follow the rule in Section 6.2 to interpret θ l = 1 + . We state the second comparison theorem about the threshold parameters under different mean field parameters z l .
Theorem 6 θ 1 and θ 2 in (15) are specified according to the following scenarios:
Proof. Since R 2 (z 1 ) > R 2 (z 2 ) > 0, we divide both sides of (15) by R 2 (z l ) and define γ l = γ R 2 (z l ) . Then 0 < γ 1 < γ 2 . The dynamic programming equation reduces to (C.2). Subsequently, the optimal policy is determined according to Lemma C.4.
Uniqueness
We look for a solution (z, a i , π) from the class C of solutions where z ∈ S and a i is a threshold policy with parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] or θ = 1 + .
Theorem 7 Under (A1)-(A5) with R(x, z) = R 1 (x)R 2 (z), the equation system (12)- (13) has at most one solution in C.
Proof. Assume two different solutions
If z 1 = z 2 , (12) ensures a i = b i , and subsequently π = ν. This is a contradiction to two different solutions. Now we can assume
We check different scenarios listed in Theorem 6. If θ 1 ∈ (0, 1) so that θ 2 ∈ (θ 1 , 1), Theorem 5 implies z 1 ≤ z 2 , which contradicts (17) . For all remaining scenarios, it is easy to show z 1 ≤ z 2 , which again contradicts (17) . Therefore, assumption (16) does not hold. Uniqueness follows.
Conclusion
This paper considers mean field games in a framework of multi-agent Markov decision processes (MDP). Each player has a monotone cost function and can apply resetting control to the state process. Decentralized strategies are obtained as threshold policies. We further examine a system of stationary equations of the mean field game and study uniqueness of the solution under positive externalities.
Appendix A: Technical Lemmas for Section 5
Let X be a random variable with distribution ν ∈ P 0 . Set
by applying the threshold policy a i t with parameter r ∈ (0, 1). Then
Proof. We can directly show that the probability density function of Y 0 is
In this case P (Y 0 = 0) = 0.
Proof. It is clear that P (Y 1 = 0) = P (X ≥ r). The distribution of Y 1 restricted on (0, 1] is absolutely continuous with respect to µ Leb . Denote
Then for B ∈ B(S),
The lemma follows. Let z 0,T ∈ Z m 0 T be fixed, and denote the associated optimal policy by a i 0,T . Select another sequence
T and let the optimal policy be denoted by
Based on (H2), we consider two cases. Case A) a i t (x) = a 0 for all x ∈ S.
Lemma A.3 For case A) and any ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for all
t is a threshold policy with parameter r ′ and 0 < 1 − r ′ < ǫ.
T is used in the optimal control problem in (H2), denote the value function byV (t, x). DefineǴ t (x) in place of G t (x). ThenǴ t (x) is continuous and strictly increasing for each t. Since V depends on z 0,T continuously,
Consider any 0 < ǫ < 1. We only need to treat the following two scenarios. 1) ρG t+1 (1) < ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ. By (A.2), there exists δ > 0 such that for all z ′ 0,T satisfying d(z ′ 0,T , z 0,T ) ≤ δ, we have
For such z ′ 0,T , if ρǴ t+1 (1) ≤ ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ, we select b i t (x) = a 0 for all x ∈ S and then i) holds. If
by (A.5), we can find r ′ ∈ (1 − ǫ, 1) such that
which further determines b i t as a threshold policy with parameter r ′ . Case B). There exists r ∈ (0, 1) such that a i t is a threshold policy with parameter r.
Lemma A.4 For case B), when d(z ′ 0,T , z 0,T ) is sufficiently small, b i t is a threshold policy with parameter r ′ ∈ (0, 1) and in addition, r ′ → r as z ′ 0,T → z 0,T .
Proof. We have ρG t+1 (r) = ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ. Fix a small ǫ > 0 such that (r − ǫ, r + ǫ) ⊂ (0, 1). Then ρG t+1 (r − ǫ) < ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ, ρG t+1 (r + ǫ) > ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ.
By (A.2), we may select δ > 0 such that for all z ′ 0,T satisfying d(z ′ 0,T , z 0,T ) ≤ δ, we have ρǴ t+1 (r − ǫ) < ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ, ρǴ t+1 (r + ǫ) > ρV (t + 1, 0) + γ.
SinceǴ t+1 (x) is strictly increasing, there exists a unique r ′ ∈ (r − ǫ, r + ǫ) such that
where r ′ depends on z ′ 0,T . This in turn determines the threshold policy b i t with parameter r ′ . Since ǫ can be arbitrarily small, the last part of the lemma follows.
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
Consider 0 < θ < 1. The definitions of irreducibility, aperiodicity and a small set follow those in [33] . Let δ x be the dirac measure at x ∈ R. Let ϕ := δ 0 . So δ 0 (B) = 1 B (0) for B ∈ B(S).
Throughout this appendix, we write x t := x i,θ t in order to keep the notation light.
Lemma B.1 {x t , t ≥ 0} is ϕ-irreducible.
Proof. We can directly verify that
The above probabilities of the process are calculated by setting the distribution for x 0 as the dirac measure δ x . This implies that {x t , t ≥ 0} is ϕ-irreducible.
Lemma B.2 {x t , t ≥ 0} is aperiodic.
Proof. Define C s = {0}. Denote ǫ 0 = 1 θ f ξ (y)dy > 0 and the measure ν = ǫ 0 δ 0 . Then
For any B ∈ B(S), then
Therefore, we can take C s as a small set with ν(C s ) = ǫ 0 . Given x 0 = 0 ∈ C s , we further check
Then for any B ∈ B(S),
Since time indices 2 and 3 in (B.1) and (B.2) have the greatest common divisor equal to 1, {x t , t ≥ 0} is aperiodic [33, pp. 112-114] . The Markov process {x t , t ≥ 0} is said to satisfy Doeblin's condition if there exist a probability measure φ on B(S) and ǫ < 1,
Lemma B.3 Doeblin's condition holds for {x t , t ≥ 0}.
Proof. We take φ = δ 0 , and in this case φ(B) > 0 implies 0 ∈ B. It suffices to show {(x i t ,â i t ), t ≥ 1} and {(x i t ,ǎ i t ), t ≥ 0}, wherex i 0 = 0, have the same finite dimensional distributions. In particular,â i t+1 andǎ i t have the same distribution for t ≥ 0. Therefore,
It follows that
Combining (C.2) and (C.3) gives
which implies For each fixed r ∈ (0, ∞), we obtain the optimal policy as a threshold policy with parameter θ(r). By evaluating the cost (C.1) associated with the two policies a i t (x i t ) ≡ a 0 and a i t (x i t ) ≡ a 1 , respectively, we have the prior estimate
On the other hand, let {x i t , t ≥ 0} with x i 0 = x be generated by any fixed Markov policy. Then
1−ρ , it follows from (C.7) that
i.e., θ(r) = 1 + .
Lemma C.2 There exists δ > 0 such that for all 0 < r < δ,
and so θ(r) = 0.
Proof. By (C.8),
and (C.7) gives
Since R 1 (x) is strictly increasing,
and
It suffices to take δ = ρ(1 − ρ)C R 1 . Define the nonempty sets R a 0 = {r > 0|(C.9) hods}, R a 1 = {r > 0|(C.10) holds}.
Remark C.1 We have (
Lemma C.3 Let (r, v r ) be the parameter and the associated solution in (C.6). i) If r > 0 satisfies
Proof. i) For r ′ > r, v r ′ is uniquely solved from (C.6) with r ′ in place of r. We can use (C.11) to verify
ii) By (C.6) and (C.12),
and subsequently,
By substituting v r (0) and v r (x) into (C.12), we obtain
Now for 0 < r ′ < r, we construct v r ′ (x), as a candidate solution to (C.6) with r replaced by r ′ , to satisfy
We show that v r ′ (x) in (C.15) satisfies
which is equivalent to
which in turn follows from (C.13). By (C.14) and (C.16), v r ′ indeed satisfies (C.6) with r replaced by r ′ . So r ′ ∈ R a 1 . Further define r = sup R a 1 , r = inf R a 0 .
Lemma C.4 i) r satisfies
and θ(r) = 0. ii) r satisfies
and θ(r) = 1. iii) We have 0 < r < r < ∞. iv) θ(r) is continuous and strictly increasing on [r, r].
Proof. i)-ii) By Lemmas C.2 and C.3, we have 0 < r ≤ ∞ and 0 ≤ r < ∞. Assume r = ∞; then R a 1 = (0, ∞) giving R a 0 = ∅, a contradiction. So 0 < r < ∞. For δ > 0 in Lemma C.2, we have (0, δ) ⊂ R a 1 . Therefore, 0 <r < ∞. Note that v r depends on the parameter r continuously, i.e., lim |r ′ −r|→0 sup x |v r ′ (x) − v r (x)| = 0. Hence
(C.17)
Then there exists a sufficiently small ǫ > 0 such that (C.17) still holds when (r + ǫ, v r+ǫ ) replaces (r, v r ); since g(x) = 1 0 v r+ǫ (y)Q 0 (dy|x) is increasing in x, then r + ǫ ∈ R a 1 , which is impossible. Hence (C.17) does not hold, and this proves i). ii) can be shown in a similar manner.
To show iii), assume 0 < r < r < ∞.
Then, recalling Remark C.1, there exist r ′ ∈ R a 0 and r ′′ ∈ R a 1 such that 0 < r < r ′ < r ′′ < r < ∞.
By Lemma C.3-i), r ′ < r ′′ ∈ R a 0 , and then r ′′ ∈ R a 0 ∩ R a 1 = ∅, which is impossible. Therefore, (C.18) doe not hold and we conclude 0 < r ≤ r < ∞. We further assume r = r. Then i)-ii) would imply If θ(r 1 ) > θ(r 2 ) in (C. 19) , by the continuity of θ(r), θ(r) = 0, θ(r) = 1, and the intermediate value theorem we may find r ′ ∈ (r, r 1 ) such that θ(r ′ 1 ) = θ(r 2 ). Next, we replace r 1 by r ′ 1 . Thus if θ(r) is not strictly increasing, we may find r 1 < r 2 from (r, r) such that θ(r 1 ) = θ(r 2 ) ∈ (0, 1), which is a contradiction to Lemma C.1. This proves iv).
Remark C.2 By Lemmas C.3 and C.4, R a 1 = (0, r) and R a 0 = (r, ∞).
Remark C.3 If (A4) is replaced by P (ξ ∈ (0, 1)) > 0 without assuming a probability density function f ξ , we still have C R 1 > 0 in the proof of Lemma C.2 and all results in this appendix hold. where τ = inf{t|Y t ≤ λ}.
By (A4), P (τ < ∞) = 1, and moreover, Eτ < ∞. Set Y τ +1 = 1 and the process {Y t , t ≥ 0} further evolves from state 1 at time τ + 1 as a Markov chain with a stationary transition probability kernel. Denote S t = Proof. Take λ = 1 − θ. Since {Y t , t ≥ 0} has the same transition probability kernel as {m i,θ t , t ≥ 0}, it is ergodic, and therefore the left hand side of (D.2) has a constant limit w.p.1. Define T 0 = 0 and T n as the time for {Y t , t ≥ 0} to return to state 1 for the nth time. Define B n = Tn−1 t=T n−1 Y t for n ≥ 1. We observe that {Y t , t ≥ 0} is a regenerative process (see e.g. [4, 38] and [5, Theorem 4] ) with regeneration times {T n , n ≥ 1} and that {B n , n ≥ 1} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables. Note that B 1 = S τ is the sum of τ + 1 terms. By the strong law of large numbers for regenerative processes [4, pp. 177 ], the lemma follows.
Define another Markov chain {Y ′ t , t ≥ 0} after replacing λ in (D.1) by λ ′ ∈ (0, λ), and τ by Denote α = Eξ. Then α ∈ (0, 1) by (A4). We obtain
By the independence ofξ k and ζ k−1 1 {ζ k−1 >λ} for k ≥ 2, it follows that E(Y k 1 {τ ≥k} ) = E(ξ k ζ k−1 1 {ζ k−1 >λ} ) = αE(ζ k−1 1 {ζ k−1 >λ} ).
This gives
For k ≥ 1, denote
We have Since r k ≥ λp k for k ≥ 1, we only need to show 2αλ ≤ 1 + α, which follows from 0 < α < 1, 0 < λ < 1. Suppose 0 < θ < θ ′ < 1. Then there exist two constants C θ , C θ ′ such that 
